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Summary findings
Banking markets are becoming increasingly international  have greater profits, higher interest marginis,  and higher
through financial liberalization and general economic  tax paymenits.
integration.  It is common to read, in the literature  on foreign
Using bank-level  data  for 80 countries  for  t988-9S,  banking, that the entry of foreign banks can make
Claessens,  Demirgiu-Kunt,  and  Huizinga  examine  the  national banking markets more competitive, thereby
extent  of foreign  ownership  in national  banking  forcing domestic banks to operate  more efficiently.
markets.  They compare  net interest  margins,  Claessens, Demirgiiu-Kunt, and Huizinga show that
overhead,  taxes paid,  and  profitability  of  foreign  and  increasing the foreign share of bank ownership does
domestic  banks.  indeed reduce profitability and overhead expenses in
The comparative  functions of foreign banks and  domestically owned banks - so the general effect of
domestic banks is very different in developing and  foreign bank entry may be positive.
industrial countries,  possibly because of a different  Interestingly, the number of foreign entrants matters
customer base, different  bank procedures, and different  more than  their market share, suggesting that they affect
regulatory and tax regimes:  local bank competition  more on entry rather  than after
* In developing countries  foreign banks tend  to have  gaining a substantial market share.
greater profits, higher interest margins, and higher tax  These effects hold even when controlling  for the fact
payments than  do domestic banks.  that  foreign banks may be attracted  to markets with
*  In industrial countries it is the domestic banks that  certain characteristics, such as low banking costs.
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Recent years have seen an increased importance of international trade in goods
and  financial services.  To  facilitate  such  trade,  many banking  institutions  have  also
become international. 2 Banks expand internationally by establishing foreign subsidiaries
and branches or by taking over established foreign banks. The internationalization of the
banking  sector  is  facilitated  by  the  liberalization  of  financial  markets  worldwide.
Developed and developing countries alike now increasingly allow banks to be foreign-
owned.
Financial  liberalization of this  kind proceeds on the premise  that the  gains  to
domestic market participants from foreign entry outweigh any losses to domestic banking
institutions. Several authors have addressed the potential benefits of foreign bank entry
for the domestic economy in terms of better resource allocation and higher efficiency (see
Levine  (1996), Walter and  Gray (1983), and Gelb and  Sagarn (1990)). Levine  (1996)
specifically mentions that foreign banks may (i) improve the quality and availability of
financial services in the domestic financial market by increasing bank competition, and
enabling  the application  of more modern banking skills  and technology,  (ii) serve  to
stimulate the development of the underlying bank supervisory and legal framework, and
(iii) enhance a country's  access to international capital.
As yet, little cross-country systematic evidence exists that these presumed benefits
of  an  internationalization  of  the  banking  sector  indeed  materialize.  The  literature,
however,  contains  several case studies of  financial liberalization  episodes. McFadden
2(1994) reviews foreign bank entry in Australia, and finds that this has lead to improved
domestic  bank  operations.  Bhattacharaya  (1993) reports  specific  cases  in  Pakistan,
Turkey, and Korea, where foreign banks helped to make foreign capital accessible to fund
domestic projects.  Pigott (1986) describes the policies that have made increased foreign
bank activity possible  in nine Pacific Basin countries, and he provides some aggregate
statistics on the size and scope of foreign banking activities. 3 Using aggregate accounting
data, Terrell (1986, Table 20-2) further compares the banking markets of 14 developed
countries  (8  of  which  allow  foreign  bank  entry)  for  1976 and  1977.  Interestingly,
countries  that  allow  foreign  bank  entry  on  average  experience  lower  gross  interest
margins, lower pre-tax profits, and lower operating costs (all scaled by the volume  of
business). Terrell (1986), however, does not control for influences on  domestic banking
other than whether or not foreign banks are permitted to enter. This paper aims to provide
a  systematic  study of  how foreign  bank presence  has  affected the  domestic  banking
markets  in  80  countries.  To  do  this,  we  use  bank-level  accounting  data  and
macroeconomic data for the 1988-1995 period.
We first examine the scale of foreign bank operations in each of the 80 countries.
To ensure foreign control of operations, we define a bank to  be foreign, if  at least 50
2See  Aliber  (1984) for an early survey  of the literature  on the internationalization  of banking.
3 Cho and Khatkhate  (1989) provide  in-depth  case studies  of financial  liberalization  in five Asian  countries,
however  with  no particular  emphasis  on foreign  bank entry. Liberalization,  though, is shown  to lead to
faster growth  of the financial  system  and  to increased  competitiveness  of the banking  system,  even if there
is no conclusive  evidence  that financial  liberalization  leads  to lower intemediation  margins.  In their
comparative  study,  Frankel  and Montgomery  (1991)  also  bypass  the issue  of internationalization.
3percent  of  its shares  is foreign-owned.  As  measures of foreign bank  penetration, we
consider the importance of foreign banks in terms of numbers and in terms of assets.
The data also allow us to consider how foreign banks differ from domestic banks
in terms of interest margins, taxes paid, overhead expenses, loan loss provisioning, and
profitability.  This work extends the work on the accounting decomposition of interest
margins by Hanson and Rocha (1986) and, more recently, Demirgtu,-Kunt and Huizinga
(1997) to look at foreign and domestic banks separately. While foreign banks have lower
interest margins, overhead expenses, and profitability than domestic banks in developed
countries (consistent with Terrell's  (1986) findings), the opposite is true in developing
countries. This suggests that the reasons for foreign entry, as well as the competitive and
regulatory  conditions  found  abroad,  differ  significantly  between  developed  and
developing countries.
Next, we estimate empirically how foreign bank entry, measured as the change in
the share of foreign banks in the total number, affects the operation of domestic banks.
We find that the entry of foreign banks reduces the profitability of domestic banks, while
there is some evidence that the non-interest income and the overall expenses of domestic
banks are also  negatively affected by foreign bank  entry. Following  Amel and Liang
(1997), we next estimate a two equation model of the interrelationships between foreign
bank presence and profitability (and other characteristics of domestic banks). Again, we
find that a large foreign bank presence leads to a low domestic bank profitability, and
interestingly a high provisioning for bad loans by domestic banks. Further, we find that
low banking costs and low non-interest income of domestic banks are factors that can
4explain a high foreign bank presence. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents  some data on the relevance of foreign banks in 80 national banking
markets. Section  3  presents the empirical results, while section 4 concludes.
2.  The data
Below,  we  present  information from  the  income  statements  of  domestic  and
foreign commercial banks. The data comes from the BankScope data base provided by
IBCA (for a complete list of  data sources and variable definitions, see the Appendix).
Coverage by IBCA is comprehensive, with  banks included roughly  accounting for 90
percent  of  the assets of  banks in each country. We start with the entire universe of
commercial banks, with the exception that for France, Germany and the United States
only  several  hundred  commercial  banks  listed  as  'large'  are  included.  To  ensure
reasonable coverage for individual countries, we include only countries where there are at
least three banks in a country for a given year. This yields a data set covering 80 countries
during the years 1988-1995, with about 7900 individual commercial bank observations.
This  data set includes all OECD countries, as well as many developing countries and
economies in transition.
This section first provides information on aggregate income statement items for domestic
and foreign banks in the 80 countries individually. We then present accounting averages
for country  groups, by  income  and geographical  location to  illustrate the differences
between domestic and foreign banks in developing and developed countries.  From the
bank's income statement, we can drive the following  accounting identity:
5(1)  net margin/ta + non-interest income/ta = before tax profits/ta  +  overhead/ta +
loan loss provisioning/ta
The first two ratios are the accounting value of a bank's  net interest income over
total assets, or net margin/ta,and net non-interest income over total  assets, non-interest
income/ta.  The non-interest income/ta accounts for the fact that many banks also engage
in non-lending activities, such as investment banking and brokerage services. To reflect
bank profitability, we consider the bank's  before-tax profits over total assets, or before
tax profits/ta. The overhead/ta variable represents the bank's  entire overhead, while loan
loss provisioning/ta  simply measures actual provisioning for bad debts.
While the underlying data reflects international accounting standards as much as
possible,  some differences in accounting conventions regarding the valuation of assets,
loan loss provisioning, hidden reserves, etc., no doubt remain. 4 We focus on accounting
measures of income and profitability, as (risk-adjusted) financial returns on bank stocks
are equalized by investors in the absence of prohibitive international investment barriers.5
Similarly, Gorton and Rosen (1995) and Schranz (1993) focus on accounting measures of
profitability when examining managerial entrenchment and bank takeovers.
First,  we  consider the  extent  of  foreign bank  penetration  in  national banking
markets. Table 1 presents two measures of foreign bank penetration: the share of banks
4See  Vittas (1991)  for an account  of the pitfalls  in interpreting  international  bank  operating  ratios.
5Also,  financial  returns  data are not available  for a similarly  large  set of banks  and  countries.
6that is  foreign-owned, and  the share of  foreign bank  assets in total  bank  assets.  The
number penetration measure is an appropriate measure, if the number of domestic and
foreign banks determines competitive conditions. This is the case, if domestic banking
firms  adjust the pricing  of their  lending and  other activities  as soon as  foreign entry
occurs  to  prevent  the  foreign  entrants  from  ever  capturing  significant market  share.
Alternatively, the share penetration measure is appropriate, if foreign banks start to have
an impact the pricing and profitability of domestic banks only after gaining substantial
size. Foreign banks may indeed have to be sizable for there to be any significant transfer
of  banking  technology  to  the  domestic  banking  sector. Note  that  either  penetration
measure is a measure of actual foreign banking penetration, and thus does not capture the
disciplining effects on  domestic banks of potential foreign bank  entry.  The threat  of
foreign bank entry, however, may not be credible in the absence of actual entry.
From Table  1, we see  that for most  countries the  number foreign penetration
measure exceeds the asset penetration measure (this  is the case for France, Germany,
Italy, the U.K. and the U.S., but not Japan). This reflects that foreign banks tend to be
smaller than domestic banks. Either penetration measure is zero for Finland, Guatemala,
Haiti, India,  Malta,  Oman, and  Yemen, reflecting  regulatory barriers to  foreign bank
entry. At the other extreme, Nepal and Swaziland only have foreign-owned banks in our
sample. Other countries with a large foreign bank presence (with both foreign penetration
measures of at least 75 percent) are Bahrain, Botswana, Luxembourg, and New Zealand.
A colonial past or the presence of a large neighboring country can explain some of these
high ratios. Among the developed countries, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Sweden and the
7United  States  have  relatively  insulated  banking  markets,  with  foreign  penetration
measures below 1O  percent. 6 The last column for each country reports the total number of
banks in the sample for 1995.
Next,  we  consider  whether there  is  a  systematic  link between  foreign  bank
penetration and national income. In Table 2 we present average foreign penetration shares
by  national  income  group.'  Interestingly, the  foreign  asset  share  in  the  low-income
countries  is comparable  to  that  of the  high-income countries,  with  somewhat higher
penetration shares for middle-income countries. This finding suggests that differences in
national foreign penetration shares in Table  1 are primarily due to national differences
unrelated to national income. Table 2 also provides a breakdown of the average foreign
penetration share by geographical region. 8 Interestingly, the foreign penetration share is
highest in the group of transitional economies at 0.54.
Next, Table 3 presents the net interest margins and other accounting variables for
domestic and foreign banks in the 80 countries in the 1988-1995 period. An ownership
index of  zero refers to the group of domestic banks, while a value of one refers to the
foreign banks. As already evident from Table 1, not all countries harbor both domestic
and foreign banks.
6  Previous studies, such as DeYoung and Nolle (I 996) report foreign bank penetration ratios of almost 50
percent for the U.S. However these studies define a bank as foreign if has more than  10 percent foreign
ownership. In addition,  these studies  include  off-shore  operations  of foreign  banks. Data reported  in
Federal Reserve Bulletins confirm the figures we obtain above.
7For  country groupings by income, see the World Development Report (1996).
8 Countries in transition are China, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Russia, and Slovenia. Neither this group of countries nor the industrial economies are in regions in the
strict sense.
8In  some  developing  countries (such  as  Costa  Rica,  Jamaica, and  Venezuela),
foreign banks are able to realize net interest incomes of over 10 percent of assets. In these
countries and in many other developing countries, foreign banks in fact achieve higher
net  interest  margins  than  domestic  banks.  Instead, in  most  developed  countries  (for
instance, in France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), foreign
banks obtain lower net interest margins than domestic banks.
These differences may reflect varying reasons for banks to  go abroad as well as
the diverse regulatory conditions they find  abroad after entering.  Some banks  expand
abroad  to  be  able  to  serve  and  retain  important  domestic  customers  with  foreign
operations,  even if  this  does not  translate  into sizable  interest  margins. Perhaps  this
reason  for  foreign  entry  is  particularly  important  for  the  developed  countries.  The
relatively low interest margins foreign banks obtain in the developed countries may also
reflect  that  foreign  banks  in  these  countries  engage  in  more  competitively  priced
wholesale rather than retail transactions.  These low margins may also be due to the fact
that  any technical  advantages foreign banks may have in  developed countries are not
significant enough  to  overcome  the informational  disadvantages they  face relative  to
domestic banks.
In  developing  countries,  foreign  banks  may  be  able  to  realize  high  interest
margins, because they are frequently exempt from credit allocation regulations and other
such restrictions. Especially in countries where domestic banking markets are dominated
by state banks, institutions frequently use non-commercial criteria to allocate their credit.
Furthermore, pervasive market inefficiencies and outmoded banking practices that exist
9in  developing  countries  should also  lead to  high  interest  margins  for foreign  banks,
outweighing the information disadvantages they face.
The overhead/ta variable reflects the bank's overhead associated with its deposit
and loan operations as well as any other activities. Foreign banks can be expected to face
high overhead costs if they have to overcome large informational disadvantages, but they
may have low overhead expenses if they engage mostly in wholesale transactions. Most
developed countries, such as Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States have foreign banks with lower overhead (as a percentage of assets) than domestic
banks.  In  many  developing  countries  however,  foreign  banks  tend  to  have  higher
overhead.
Next, the tax/ta variable reflects primarily the corporate income tax in the host
country.  Differences in this variable between domestic and foreign banks may reflect a
different de jure tax treatment, although most countries do not discriminate in this regard.
More likely, any tax burden differences reflect differences in the activity mix, and banks'
efforts to  shift  profits worldwide so as to minimize their  global tax bill.  Prima facie,
foreign banks can be expected to have more opportunities to shift taxable income abroad
than domestic banks. In any event, banks have an incentive to shift profits out of (into)
high-tax (low-tax) jurisdictions.  An interesting case is the United States where foreign
banks  pay  about two  thirds  the taxes  paid by  domestic banks  (tax/ta of  0.3  vs.  0.5
percent). Also in some other developed countries, such as in Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, France, the Netherlands and Spain, foreign banks pay relatively low taxes.  This
pattern is not as pervasive in developing countries: counter examples include Colombia,
10Costa  Rica,  and  Egypt.  An important determinant  of actual tax  bill  is no  doubt  tax
enforcement, which varies from country to country.
Next,  the loan  loss provisioning/ta  variable measures provisioning  during the
accounting year for any previously contracted credits. Differences between domestic and
foreign  banks  here  may  reflect  a  difference  in  customer  mix  (with  foreign  banks
concentrating  on  large  corporations  rather  than  mortgage  or  consumer  loans).
Alternatively,  different  provisioning  ratios  may  reflect  differences  in  foreign  and
domestic  banks'  ability to  screen bad credit  risks. On net, foreign banks have higher
provisioning in Germ-any,  Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, but lower
provisioning in Austria, Canada, and France. Also in developing countries, foreign banks
do better or worse than domestic banks in this regard in specific cases.
Finally, the table provides information on differences in net profits over assets, or
net profits/ta,  for domestic and foreign banks. As an accounting residual, this variable is
affected  by  each  of the  foregoing accounting variables  in  the  table.  In  addition,  the
required net profits of foreign banks may be influenced by the tax regime of the bank's
parent country. A foreign bank that will benefit from a foreign tax credit, for instance,
may  accept  a  relatively  low  net-of-host-country-tax  profitability.  At  the  same  time,
domestic and foreign banks may accept different net profits to the extent that their cost of
capital  differs.  Foreign  banks,  specifically,  may  be  able  to  raise  equity  capital
internationally, and therefore accept a lower net profitability. Foreign banks have lower
net profits in most developed countries, whereas they generally have higher net profits in
developing countries. DeYoung and Nolle (1996) have argued that foreign banks in the
11United  States have  been relatively less profitable, because they valued  growth  above
profitability.
Table  4  provides  average  accounting  data  for  banks  by  different  country
groupings. Considering the breakdown by income, we see that foreign banks on average
obtain  lowest  interest  margins  in  high-income  countries,  and  they  achieve  highest
margins  in  lower  income  countries. At  the same time,  foreign banks  achieve  higher
(lower) interest margins than domestic banks in low income and lower middle income
(high  middle  income  and  high  income)  countries.  Overhead expenses,  taxes  and  net
profitability of foreign banks in low-income countries similarly tend to be relatively high.
Note that banks in low-income countries have higher overhead expenses than banks in
high-income  countries,  despite  lower  wages  in  low-income  countries.  This  probably
reflects bank overstaffing and difficulties in evaluating loans in  low-income countries.
Interestingly, for all four income groups foreign banks have higher loan loss provisioning
than domestic banks. despite the fact that foreign banks generally provide relatively little
risky consumer credit.  The reason  may be that foreign banks  are at  an informational
disadvantage  in  identifying  good  credit  risks,  or  that  they  have  more  conservative
reserving policies.
Turning to  the breakdown  by  geographical region, we  see  that  foreign banks
achieve far  better  interest  margins  in Africa than the  domestic banks.  Generally, for
domestic  and  foreign  banks alike  the  achieved interest margins  are highest  in  Latin
America and in the transitional economies. In both cases, high overhead expenses seem to
be the driving factor behind the high  interest margins. Except in Africa, foreign banks
12have higher non-interest income to total asset ratios compared to domestic banks since
they tend to engage in nonlending activities to a greater extent.  Turning to taxes paid,
the taxation of banking appears to be very high in the transitional economies, followed by
Africa.  Foreign banks pay lower taxes only in transitional and industrialized economies.
Finally,  only  in  Africa  and  in  Latin  America  do  foreign banks  achieve  higher  net
profitability than the domestic banks.
3.  Empirical estimation
In previous work, Demirgiu,-Kunt and Huizinga (1997) investigate how a  variety
of  bank  variables,  including  ownership,  affect  banks'  net  interest  income  and
profitability. 9 Foreign  ownership  is  found to  lead  to  higher net  interest  margins  and
profits in developing countries, while this result is reversed in developed countries. As a
different issue, this section investigates how foreign bank entry affects the operation of
domestic banks. Specifically, we investigate how foreign bank entry affects each of the
five variables in the accounting equation (1), including bank profitability.
To start, we will estimate the following equation in first differences'°
(2)  AIJt = ao +  JAFSjt  + Iii  ABit+  j  IAXjt  + syt
9In  related  work, Barth,  Nolle, and Rice (1997)  use  bank-level  accounting  data for 1993  to study  the
impact  of bank powers  on the return  to equity  for a set of 19 countries.
10  Eq. (2) is a reduced  form equation  that relates  endogenous  banking  variables,  such a prbfitability  to
banking 'inputs' such  as bank equity  and non-interest  earning  assets  and a set of controls,  including  the
foreign  bank share.  DeYoung  and  Nolle (1996),  among  others,  more  explicitly  derive  a profit function  that
relates  profitability  to bank inputs  and various  controls.
13where 1- t  = is the dependent variable (say, before tax profits/ta)  for domestic bank i in
countryj  at time t; FSjt  is the share of foreign banks in countryj  at time t (i.e. number of
foreign banks divided by the total number of banks);  Bit are bank variables for domestic
bank  i at time t, -it  are country variables for country j  at time  t.  Further,  aO  is a
constant, and /3, ,Bi, and  83j,  are coefficients, while  -ijt is an error term. All regressions
include  country  and  time-specific  fixed effects.  The estimation  is  by  weighted  least
squares, with the weight being the inverse of the number of domestic banks in a country
in a given year to correct for varying numbers of banks across countries.  We report
heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors.
The estimation results, in Table 5,  indicate that foreign bank entry significantly
reduces domestic bank profitability (column 3),  and also non-interest income and overall
expenses (columns 2 and 4), although these results are less significant. Finally, we do not
see a significant impact on net interest margins or loan loss reserves.  We interpret these
results to mean that foreign bank entry leads to greater efficiency in the domestic banking
system.  Holding other factors constant, high margins and profits reflect an absence of
competition,  while high  overhead costs  may reflect  a  less efficient  management  and
organizational structure.  Foreign bank entry may enable domestic banks to cut costs as
they  assimilate  any  superior  banking  techniques  and  practices  of  foreign  entrants.
14Alternatively,  foreign bank  entry may force domestic bank  managers to give up their
sheltered 'quiet life' and to exert greater effort to reach cost efficiency."
Turning to control variables,  we see that inflation and real interest rate variables
are positively related to the net interest margin, before tax profits, and overheads.  These
results  are consistent  with the belief  that high interest  rate and high  inflation  lead to
higher bank margins and profits although cost of operating in those environments is also
higher. Increases in overhead/ta is also associated with relatively higher interest and non-
interest income and lower profits. The first difference of per capital income, or Gdp/cap,
interestingly is associated with reduced costs as well as loan loss provisioning. Perhaps
banks can more easily reduce costly employment when incomes are growing.
As an alternative definition of the foreign bank share, we can take it to be the ratio
of foreign bank assets to total bank assets. After substituting for the foreign bank share,
we find this variable enters all five (unreported) regressions as in Table 5 with a negative
but insignificant coefficient. From this, we infer that the number of foreign players rather
than their size determines competitive conditions in national banking markets.' 2
In  estimating  equation  (2)  we  implicitly  assume  that  foreign  bank  entry  is
exogenous  to  the  contemporaneous  change  in  domestic  banking  variables.  This
Berger (1998) estimates that the efficiency costs related to market power as explained by the 'quiet life'
hypothesis are substantial.
12 One possible explanation is that domestic banks already change their competitive behavior upon the
entry of foreign banks before these banks have gained their long-run market share. Even in the long run,
however, the number of foreign competitors may be related to, say, domestic banking profits, even if their
lending market share (as proxied by relative asset size) does not. This can be illustrated by a simple
Cournot model of competition between n domestic banks and n* foreign banks. It is then possible that a
change in n* affects the profits of each domestic bank without affecting the relative market share of all
foreign banks together.
15assumption  is correct  if  the foreign  bank  presence at time  t  is  determined  by  entry
incentives as of period t-I.  This assumption also underlies the work of  Amel and Liang
(1997) who investigate the determinants of entry and profits in local banking markets in
the United States. Specifically, these authors estimate two equations, one explaining the
entry decision, and the other explaining the impact of entry on contemporaneous local
banking profits. For the case of foreign bank entry, we can analogously specify a system
of two equations for the presence of foreign banks and for domestic bank profitability
(and other domestic banking variables) as follows
(3)  FSjt  =  ao + SIt-I  + .5j Bjt-I  +  5 Xjt-I  +  jfjt
(4)  Aljt =ao  +yFSjt  + yj Bjt + Yj Xjt + Ujt
Equation (3) explains the foreign bank share in countryj  at time t  by averaged
domestic bank  variable It-l  for country j,  averaged bank control variables Bjt.]  for
country j,  country variables Xjt l,  and a random error. Equation (4) explains the change
in average domestic banking variable Ijt  by the foreign bank share FSjt in marketj,  and
again bank control variables, country variables, and a random error. The stochastic terms
et and  ujt are assumed to be uncorrelated. The  foreign bank share is only endogenous to
lagged bank variables in equation (3). Therefore, the above system is recursive, and the
two equations can be estimated separately using cross-country time-series data.
The results of estimating the entry equation (3) are in Table 6. Five specifications
are given, each with a different choice for the banking variable  It-l  from the accounting
16equation  (1).  Regression  includes  country  and  time  fixed  effects.  White  (1980)
heteroskedasticity-consistent  covariance matrices are computed to  correct  for  possible
heteroskedasticity. The table indicates that low overhead cost is an important determinant
of foreign bank presence. Low cost environments are directly attractive to foreign banks,
but  indirectly  low banking  costs may  also  be  an  indicator of  a  competitive banking
environment including entry possibilities for foreign banks. We also see that lower non-
interest margins are associated with greater foreign bank presence although these result is
not very significant. Interestingly, we do not see a significant relationship between past
profits and current foreign bank presence either.  Looking at control variables, we see that
foreign banks are attracted to banking markets with low taxes and high level of per capita
income.  Finally, in some specifications, higher concentration of the banking system is
also significant with a negative sign, indicating a reduced foreign bank presence.
Regression results  of equation 4 are presented  in Table  7. Consistent with the
results  in  Table  5,  the  foreign bank  share  variable enters  the  profitability  equation
negatively  (column  3),  indicating  that  foreign  bank  entry  negatively  affects  the
profitability of domestic banks. Similarly, Amel and Liang (1997) find that entry reduces
profits in local banking markets in the U.S. Interestingly, the foreign bank share variable
has a positive impact on the level of loan loss provisioning of domestic banks (column 5).
Foreign  bank  entry may leave  domestic banks to  cater to  relatively less  creditworthy
customers,  or alternatively  foreign bank  entry triggers a  strenghtening of provisioning
regulations affecting all banks, thus leading to larger reported provisioning for bad debts
by domestic banks.
174.  Conclusion
Banking markets are becoming increasingly international on account of financial
liberalization and overall economic integration. This paper presents evidence on the scale
of foreign participation in national banking markets in 80 countries. Also, it provides
some  evidence on how foreign banks operate differently from domestic  banks.  These
differences can reflect a different customer base, different bank procedures as well  as
different relevant regulatory and tax regimes. A main finding is that foreign banks tend to
have higher  interest  margins, profitability,  and tax  payments than  domestic  banks  in
developing countries, while the opposite is true in developed countries.
In the literature on  foreign banking, it is frequently asserted that  foreign bank
entry  can render  national banking  markets  more competitive,  and  thereby  can  force
domestic  banks  to  start  operating  more  efficiently.  This  paper  provides  empirical
evidence that a larger foreign ownership share of banks indeed reduces the profitability
and the overall expenses of domestically owned banks. These results suggest that foreign
bank entry improves the functioning of national banking markets, with positive welfare
implications for banking customers.  The relaxation of restrictions on foreign bank entry
may  similarly  reduce  domestic  banking  profits,  but  with  positive  overall  welfare
implications  for the domestic  economy. An interesting finding  is that  the number  of
entrants matters rather than their market share. This indicates that foreign banks affect
local bank competition upon entry rather than after they have gained substantial market
share.
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20Table  1. Share  of Foreign  Banks in Domestic Banking Systems:  1988-1995
A foreign bank is defined to have at least 50 percent fbreign ownership.  Figures reported are ratios of number of foreign
banks to total number of banks and foreign bank assets to total bank assets in each country, respectively,  averaged over the
1988-1995 period. Total number of banks is for 1995.
No. of  Foreign  Total  No. of  Foreign  Total
fo.W-?ign  banks  bank assets  number of  foreign banks  bank assets  number of
in total  in total  banks  in total  in total  banks
Argentina  0.37  0.10  9  Lithuania  0.10  0.09  7
Australia  0.37  0.05  26  Luxembourg  0.89  0.80  107
Austria  0.29  0.31  10  Malaysia  0.09  0.06  47
Bahrain  0.81  0.97  7  Malta  0.00  0.00  7
Belgium  0.29  0.05  47  Mexico  0.04  0.02  19
Bolivia  0.29  0.36  1  0  Morocco  0.33  0.21  8
Botswana  0.75  0.94  4  Nepal  1.00  1.00  3
Brazil  0.37  0.30  41  Netherlands  0.48  0.10  20
Canada  0.64  0.07  69  New Zealand  0.85  0.91  8
Chile  0.32  0.25  20  Nicaragua  0.17  0.20  12
China  0.13  0.00  5  Nigeria  0.30  0.51  9
Colombia  0.23  0.05  28  Norway  0.12  0.01  19
Costa Rica  0.24  0.05  22  Oman  0.00  0.00  6
Cyprus  0.25  0.11  7  Pakistan  0.30  0.12  15
Czech Rep.  0.54  0.51  15  Panama  0.35  0.39  8
Denmark  0.02  0.00  56  P. New Guinea  0.50  0.34  5
Dom. Rep.  0.08  0.03  12  Paraguay  0.43  0.39  20
Ecuador  0.46  0.52  5  Peru  0.43  0.35  22
Egypt  0.10  0.01  9  Philippines  0.46  0.57  17
El Salvador  0.20  0.28  4  Poland  0.30  0.14  28
Estonia  0.43  0.35  7  Portugal  0.18  0.04  34
Finland  0.00  0.00  11  Qatar  0.00  0.00  3
France  0.24  0.08  95  Romania  0.17  0.01  7
Germany  0.37  0.25  80  Russia  0.08  0.06  14
Greece  0.58  0.77  16  S. Africa  0.22  0.02  14
Guatemala  0.00  0.00  24  Saudi Arabia  0.34  0.43  4
Haiti  0.00  0.00  3  Singapore  0.29  0.62  19
Honduras  0.29  0.23  3  Spain  0.36  0.31  38
Hong Kong  0.60  0.69  28  Sri Lanka  0.14  0.08  7
Hungary  0.61  0.61  19  Swaziland  1.00  1.00  3
India  0.00  0.00  5  Sweden  0.07  0.00  18
Indonesia  0.35  0.16  18  Taiwan  0.14  0.09  24
Ireland  0.42  0.11  12  Thailand  0.08  0.02  12
Israel  0.09  0.02  22  Tunisia  0.39  0.35  7
Italy  0.09  0.01  64  Turkey  0.13  0.01  29
Jamaica  0.50  0.48  10  U.K.  0.24  0.19  70
Japan  0.09  0.21  73  U.S.  0.04  0.03  370
Jordan  0.43  0.95  7  Venezuela  0.07  0.02  17
Korea  0.23  0.23  40  Yemen  0.00  0.00  3
Lebanon  0.49  0.57  5  Zambia  0.71  0.46  3Table 2. Share of Foreign Banks in Domestic Banking Systems: Aggregates by Income
Group and Regions
A foreign bank is defined to have at least 50 percent foreign ownership.  Figures reported are
number of foreign banks to total number of banks and foreign bank assets to total bank assets in
each  income  group  or  region  averaged  over  the  1988-1995  period.  Income  and  region
classifications  follow  World Bank  definitions as published in  the World Development  Report
(1996).
No of foreign banks  Foreign bank assets
in total  in
total
Income Groups
Low income  0.23  0.18
Lower middle income  0.26  0.23
Upper middle income  0.30  0.29
High income  0.25  0.16
Regions
Africa  0.31  0.27
Asia  0.28  0.30
Latin America  0.25  0.28
Middle East and North Africa  0.26  0.19
Transitional Economies  0.54  0.52
Industrial Economies  0.25  0.15
22Table  3. Bank Spreads  and Profitability:  Domestic vs. Foreign  Banks  1988-1995
Ownership is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bank is a foreign bank and zero otherwise.  A foreign bank is defined to
have at least 50 percent foreign ownership. Net margin/ta is defined as net interest income over total assets. Non-interest income/ta is
net non-interest income over total assets. Overhead/ta is overhead divided by total assets. Tax/ta is taxes paid over total assets.  Loan
loss provisions/ta  is loan loss provisions over total assets. Net profit/ta is net profits divided by total assets.  Ratios are calculated for
each bank in each country and then averaged for domestic and foreign banks separately over the country's  sample period. All ratios
are  in percentages.  Data are from  BankScope data base of the IBCA.  Detailed variable definitions  and sources are given in the
appendix.
Ownership  Net margin/  Non-int.  Overhead/ta  Tax/ta  Loan  loss  Net profit/ta
ta  income/ta  prov./ta
Argentina  0  5.8  5.2  7.5  0.4  1.5  1.7
1  9.9  8.1  12.6  0.4  2.4  2.5
Australia  0  3.4  1.2  3.0  0.4  0.6  0.6
1  1.5  2.0  2.4  0.0  0.7  0.4
Austria  0  2.6  0.7  2.2  0.1  0.5  0.4
1  1.4  0.8  1.7  0.0  0.3  0.2
Bahrain  0  2.6  0.9  1.3  0.0  0.6  1.6
1  2.1  0.7  1.4  0.1  0.5  0.7
Belgium  0  1.9  1.0  2.0  0.2  0.4  0.4
1  2.4  0.6  2.1  0.1  0.5  0.3
Bolivia  0  1.7  2.1  5.0  0.6  0.5  -2.2
1  4.0  1.8  3.6  0.5  0.9  0.7
Botswana  1  6.1  2.3  4.9  0.9  0.1  2.4
Brazil  0  10.1  5.3  12.0  1.2  1.4  0.8
1  6.6  3.9  6.7  1.1  1.1  1.7
Canada  0  3.0  1.2  2.6  0.4  0.6  0.6
1  1.0  0.4  0.8  0.3  0.2  0.3
Chile  0  4.5  -0.1  3.1  0.1  0.7  0.5
1  3.9  -0. 1  2.8  0.0  0.5  0.4
Colombia  0  6.2  5.2  8.0  0.5  1.0  2.0
1  7.6  2.2  6.9  0.7  0.7  1.6
CostaRica  0  12.5  1.3  6.7  0.3  5.7  1.1
1  23.4  11.2  14.0  2.9  5.3  12.3
Cyprus  0  1.8  0.8  1.7  0.2  0.3  0.5
Czech Rep.  0  3.2  1.2  1.7  0.4  2.6  -0.3
1  3.7  1.7  2.2  0.9  1.2  1.1
Denmark  0  4.8  1.0  3.6  0.2  1.7  0.3
1  6.5  1.5  5.0  0.6  1.I  1.2
Dominican Rep.  0  6.1  3.4  6.5  0.6  0.5  2.0
1  7.0  3.1  5.1  1.2  0.6  3.1
Ecuador  0  9.3  2.7  8.6  0.4  1.1  1.8
1  5.6  5.2  8.2  0.1  0.8  1.7
Egypt  0  1.3  2.5  1.4  0.3  0.7  1.4
I  I1.9  2.1  1.9  0.5  0.5  1.1
El Salvador  0  3.1  1.6  2.8  0.0  0.4  1.5
1  3.8  1.6  2.9  0.2  0.7  1.7
Finland  (  1.8  1.3  2.6  0.1  2.5  -2.1
France  0  2.7  1.5  2.8  0.2  1.1  0.1
1  2.0  1.6  2.6  0.1  0.8  0.1
23Table 3. Continued
Ownership  Net margin/  Non-int.  Overhead/ta  Tax/ta  Loan loss  Net profit/ta
ta  income/ta  prov./ta
Germany  0  2.2  1.0  2.0  0.3  0.5  0.3
1  2.0  1.2  2.1  0.3  0.7  0.2
Greece  0  3.6  2.2  3.9  0.3  0.5  1.1
1  2.7  2.4  2.9  0.4  0.6  1.1
Haiti  0  2.8  2.8  4.2  0.2  0.4  0.8
Hong Kong  0  2.6  1.4  1.6  0.2  0.1  2.1
1  2.9  1.1  1.3  0.3  0.2  2.2
Hungary  0  4.8  2.3  3.7  0.8  2.6  0.0
1  4.3  3.4  3.5  0.6  2.1  1.5
India  0  4.0  1.6  2.0  0.6  0.7  2.3
Indonesia  0  3.5  1.2  2.7  0.4  0.7  0.9
1  4.1  1.5  3.5  0.4  0.7  1.1
Ireland  0  3.6  0.9  2.9  0.3  0.5  0.8
Israel  0  2.8  1.9  3.2  0.4  0.6  0.4
1  3.7  1.5  3.4  0.6  0.7  0.4
Italy  0  3.4  1.3  3.3  0.5  0.5  0.4
1  3.4  1.8  3.8  0.5  0.5  0.5
Jamaica  1  10.8  2.7  6.4  2.2  0.3  4.6
Japan  0  1.6  0.2  1.3  0.2  0.1  0.2
1  1.4  0.3  1.1  0.2  0.2  0.2
Jordan  0  2.2  1.5  2.5  0.2  0.7  0.4
1  2.1  1.2  1.8  0.3  0.3  0.9
Korea  0  1.8  1.6  2.0  0.2  0.6  0.6
1  2.2  1.3  2.3  0.2  0.4  0.6
Lebanon  0  3.4  0.9  2.2  0.3  0.8  0.9
1  2.3  0.7  2.1  0.2  0.1  0.7
Lithuania  0  11.4  4.5  7.4  2.1  5.3  1.0
1  6.4  7.2  7.2  1.7  8.0  -3.3
Luxembourg  0  0.7  1.1  0.9  0.2  0.5  0.2
I  (0.8  0.9  0.9  0.2  0.3  0.3
Malaysia  0  2.7  0.8  1.9  0.4  0.4  0.7
1  2.6  (.9  1.3  0.7  0.3  1.2
Malta  0  2.4  1.2  2.1  0.5  0.1  0.9
Mexico  0  4.6  1.9  4.1  0.3  1.1  1.0
1  3.1  1.3  4.2  0.1  1.1  -0.9
Morocco  0  4.1  0).7  4.6  0.1  0.0  0.1
1  2.7  1.5  4.2  0.2  0.0  -0.1
Nepal  1  3.6  2.1  2.4  1.(  0.5  1.8
Netherlands  0  1.8  1.5  2.3  0.2  0.3  0.5
I  It.()  0.5  0.9  ().  1  0.3  0.2
Nicaragua  0  4.5  3.0  7.0  0.2  1.0  -0.6
1  4.8  3.1  6.4  0.3  0.6  0.7
Nigeria  0  5.0  6.1  6.9  0.8  1.3  2.1
1  6.2  4.9  7.3  0.4  2.6  0.9
Norway  0  3.3  1.0  2.9  0.1  1.5  -0.2
1  2.5  2.1  2.0  0.4  0.7  1.6
24Table 3. Continued
Ownership  Net margin/  Non-int.  Overhead/ta  Tax/ta  Loan loss  Net profit/ta
ta  income/ta  prov./ta
Oman  0  4.1  1.4  3.3  0.2  0.6  1.4
Panama  0  2.2  1.5  2.1  0.1  0.4  1.2
1  1.6  0.6  1.3  0.0  0.4  0.4
Papua New Guinea  0  4.5  3.7  5.9  0.3  0.9  1.1
I  1.6  5.1  4.3  0.5  1.0  1.0
Paraguay  0  5.4  2.2  5.1  0.3  0.6  1.6
1  6.7  2.3  6.1  0.5  0.8  1.6
Peru  0  6.6  5.8  9.0  0.8  1.8  0.8
1  5.7  5.1  7.1  0.7  1.6  1.4
Philippines  0  3.6  2.9  3.9  0.3  0.2  2.1
1  4.2  2.8  4.2  0.2  0.6  1.9
Poland  0  5.8  2.3  3.2  1.7  1.4  1.7
1  6.7  3.2  4.0  1.8  1.2  2.9
Portugal  0  3.4  1.0  2.5  0.2  1.1  0.6
1  3.3  1.4  2.4  0.6  0.4  1.3
Qatar  0  1.7  1.3  1.4  0.0  0.2  1.4
Romania  0  10.5  1.9  2.9  1.8  3.7  4.0
Russia  0  5.8  11.0  8.1  1.8  3.4  3.4
Singapore  1  1.4  0.8  0.7  0.3  0.1  1.0
South Africa  0  4.3  2.4  4.6  0.6  0.6  1.0
1  4.4  0.7  2.2  0.5  0.9  1.5
Spain  0  4.1  1.1  3.2  0.5  0.6  0.9
1  2.9  1.5  3.2  0.2  0.6  0.3
Sri Lanka  0  4.1  2.2  2.7  0.7  0.4  2.5
Swaziland  1  5.5  2.6  5.4  0.9  0.2  1.6
Sweden  0  3.3  1.5  2.5  0.1  1.9  0.3
1  0.9  0.9  1.0  0.0  0.8  0.1
Taiwan  0  2.0  0.9  1.5  0.2  0.2  0.9
1  2.1  0.8  1.5  0.2  0.3  1.0
Tunisia  0  2.0  2.3  2.2  0.2  1.1  0.8
Turkey  0  6.3  4.2  5.5  0.8  0.8  3.5
1  1.7  3.9  5.4  0.1  2.0  -1.9
U.K.  0  2.6  2.4  3.2  0.4  0.6  0.8
1  2.5  1.5  2.5  0.3  2.6  -1.4
U.S.  0  3.9  1.8  3.6  0.5  0.7  1.0
1  3.3  1.2  3.0  0.3  0.7  0.5
Venezuela  0  6.7  2.7  6.3  0.2  1.1  1.9
I  13.7  3.9  7.2  0.4  0.4  9.7
Yemen  0  4.0  -0.5  1.4  0.6  0.1  1.4
Zambia  0  -4.7  9.5  0.4  0.3  2.4  1.7
Country averages for China, Estonia, Guatemala, Honduras, New Zealand, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Thailand are not reported
due to incomplete income statements.
25Table 4.  Bank Spreads and Profitability - Domestic vs. Foreign Banks
Selected Aggregates 1988-1995.
Net margin/ta is defined as net interest income over total assets. A foreign bank is defined to have
more than  50 percent foreign ownership.  Non-interest income/ta is net non-interest income  over
total assets. Overhead/ta is overhead divided by total assets.  Tax/ta is taxes paid over total assets.
Loan loss provisions/ta is loan loss provisions over total assets. Net profit/ta is net profits divided by
total assets.  Ratios are calculated for each bank in each country and then averaged for domestic and
foreign banks separately over the country's  sample period. All ratios are in percentages. Data are
from Bankscope data base of the IBCA. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the
appendix.
Net margin/ta  Non-int.  Overhead/t  Tax/ta  Loan loss  Net
income/ta  a  prov./ta  profit/ta
Income Groups
Low income
domestic  2.63  3.39  3.23  0.46  o.86  1.46
foreign  4.12  3.07  4.49  0.53  1.04  1.12
Lower middle  income
domestic  5.59  2.99  5.06  o.62  1.46  1.44
foreign  6.06  3.26  5.27  o.75  1.21  2.09
Upper  middle income
domestic  4.19  2.03  3.94  0.42  1.02  0.83
foreign  4.12  2.22  3.82  0.46  1.o3  1.03
High income
domestic  2.70  1.22  2.45  o.25  0.74  o.48
foreign  2.35  1.16  2.12  0.27  0.60  o.51
Regions
Africa
domestic  1.51  6.00  3.94  0.56  1.43  1.59
foreign  5.53  2.65  4.96  0.67  0.94  1.61
Asia
domestic  3.19  1.80  2.69  0.38  0.46  1.47
foreign  2.75  1.83  2.39  0.42  o.45  1.31
Latin America
domestic  5.76  2.92  6.12  0.38  1.20  0.98
foreign  7.39  3.50  6.34  0.71  1.14  2.70
Middle East  and North  Africa
domestic  3.1s  1.55  2.63  o.28  0.57  1.21
foreign  2.34  1.67  2.89  o.28  0.59  0.25
Transitional economies
domestic  6.89  3.87  4.51  1.43  3.17  1.64
foreign  5.25  3.88  4.22  1.25  3.13  0.53
Industrial economies
domestic  2.80  1.24  2.60  0.27  0.78  o.40
foreign  2.32  1.25  2.25  0.25  0.67  0.40
26Table 5.  Change in Domestic Bank Profitability and Foreign Bank Entry
The  regression  is  estimated  using  weighted  least  squares pooling  bank  level  data  across  80
countries for the 1988-95 time period.  Only domestic bank observations were used. Number of
banks in each period is used to weight the observations. Regression also includes country and
time dummy variables which are not reported.  In column (1) dependent variable is the one period
change in net margin/ta defined as interest income minus interest expense over total assets.  In
column (2) it is the one period change in net non-interest income/ta. In column (3) it is the change
in before tax profits over total assets (Before tax profits/ta).  In column (4) one period change in
overhead/ta  is the dependent  variable which is defined  as personnel expenses  and other non-
interest expenses over total assets. In column (5) the dependent variable is the change in loan loss
provisions divided by total assets.  Foreign bank share is the ratio of number of foreign banks to
total  number  of  banks.  All  independent variables  are  in  first  differences.  Detailed  variable
definitions  and  data sources  are given in the  appendix.  Heteroscedasticity-corrected  standard
errors are given in parantheses.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
ANet  ANon-int.  ABefore tax  AOverhead  ALoan loss
margin/ta  income/ta  profits/ta  /ta  prov./ta
AForeign bank  -.001  -.023*  -.028**  -.O15  *  -.009
share  (.012)  (.013)  (.014)  (.009)  (.012)
AEquity/ta  .017  .040  -.002  .060  .085
(.033)  (.085)  (.138)  (.040)  (.110)
ANon-int.  -.000  .032  -.014  .061***  .071
assets/ta  (.016)  (.027)  (.048)  (.018)  (.056)
ACust& short  -.008  .044  .026***  -.023*  -.005
term funding/ta  (.015)  (.033)  (.028)  (.014)  (.014)
AOverhead/ta  .408***  .411  ***  -.597**  .482*
(.147)  (.125)  (.279)  (.265)
AGdp/cap  -.002*  -.001  .001  -.002**  -.003***
(.001)  (.001)  (.002)  (.001)  (.001)
AGrowth  .018***  -.024**  .006  .016***  -.006
(.007)  (.010)  (.008)  (.005)  (.008)
Alnflation  .019***  -.009  .013**  .016***  -.002
(.007)  (.006)  (.007)  (.005)  (.006)
AReal interest  .025***  -.013**  .016*  .015***  -.004
(.008)  (.006)  (.009)  (.005)  (.009)
Adj. B?  .19  .12  .15  .12  .22
N. of obs.  4592  3904  4592  4592  3993
**  and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and I percent respectively.
27Table 6.  Determinants of  Foreign Bank Entry
The regression is estimated using least squares pooling cross-country time-series data. Bank level
data are averaged  for each  country, each year.  Only domestic bank  observations are used  in
calculating these averages. Regression also includes country and time dummy variables which are
not reported.  Dependent variable is the foreign bank  share at time  t,  defined  as the ratio of
number of foreign banks to total number of banks. All independent variables are are lagged one
period.  Detailed  variable  definitions  and  data  sources  are  given  in  the  appendix.
Heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors are given in parantheses.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Net margin/ta t-  -.047
(.183)
Non-int income/tat-,  -.470*
(.273)
Before tax profits/tat,  .195
(.233)
Overhead/tat-,  -1 .099***
(.264)
Loan loss prov./ta,  -.056
(.246)
Equity/tat,  -.125  -.112  -.101  -.034  -.123
(.131)  (.129)  (.133)  (.125)  (.135)
Cust& short term  .043  .055  .063  .026  .038
funding/tat-l  (.096)  (.086)  (.087)  (.088)  (.096)
Tax rate-  -.062**  -.057*  -.071 **  -.070***  -.066**
(.031)  (.035)  (.033)  (.028)  (.033)
Reserves1 t-  -.067  -.011  -.064  -.021  -.069
(.086)  (.081)  (.081)  (.075)  (.083)
Concentration,-,  -.048  -.046  -.051*  -.070**  -.057
(.033)  (.036)  (.032)  (.032)  (.048)
Gdp/cap 1 ,-  .017**  .016**  .017**  .012*  .016*
(.008)  (.008)  (.008)  (.008)  (.009)
Growth,-  .014  -.017  ,  .006  .037  .014
(.081)  (.101)  (.077)  (.079)  (.079)
Inflation  .002  -.019>  X  ,-.005  .046  .001
(.040)  (.039)  "t  (.039)  (.040)  (.041)
Real interest  1 ,  .001  -.020  -.008  .030  .001
(.045)  (.045)  (.043)  (.043)  (.043)
Adj. R2 .96  .95  .96  .96  .96
N. of obs.  237  216  237  237  226
** and *** indicate significance levels of 10. 5 and I percent respectively.
28Table 7.  Determinants of Bank Profitability
The regression is estimated using least squares pooling cross-country time-series data. Bank level
data are averaged  for each country, each year.  Only domestic bank  observations are used in
calculating these averages. Regression also includes country and time dummy variables which are
not reported. Dependent variable is the one period change in relevant variable. Foreign bank share
is the ratio of number of foreign banks to total number of banks. Detailed variable definitions and
data sources are given in the appendix.  Heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors are given in
parantheses.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
ANet  ANon-int.  ABefore tax  AOverhead  ALoan loss
margin/ta  income/ta  profits/ta  /ta  prov./ta
Foreign bank  .021  -.011  -.030**  -.004  .029**
sharet  (.014)  (.014)  (.013)  (.010)  (.013)
Equity/tat  -.030  .140**  -.042  .086**  .176*
(.063)  (.054)  (.066)  (.036)  (.092)
Non-int.  .027  -.038  -.021  .038  .001
assets/tat  (.033)  (.030)  (.031)  (.020)  (.034)
Cust& short  -.041  .068**  .017  -.028  .032
term funding/tat  (.043)  (.033)  (.041)  (.019)  (.042)
Overhead/tat  .106  .044  -.263**  .028
(.138)  (.152)  (.113)  (.213)
Tax ratet  -.009  -.008  .021  -.021***  -.024
(.008)  (.007)  (.019)  (.007)  (.015)
Reserves,  -.013  .107***  .048*  .024  .031
(.057)  (.033)  (.026)  (.024)  (.026)
Concentrationt  .004  -.004  -.017**  .007  .006
(.010)  (.010)  (.008)  (.009)  (.014)
Gdp/cap,  .000  .001  .006**  -.001  -.004**
(.001)  (.001)  (.003)  (.001)  (.002)
Growth 1 .026**  -.006  .009  .005  .004
(.012)  (.013)  (.012)  (.008)  (.016)
Inflationt  .019*  .003  .012  .010  .010
(.012)  (.006)  (.010)  (.011)  (.012)
Real interestt  .023**  -.005  .007  .011  .009
(.011)  (.011)  (.008)  (.011)  (.009)
Adj. Ri  .16  .02  .36  .24  .08
N. of obs.  225  201  225  225  211
** and *** indicate  significance  levels  of iO.  5 and 1 percent  respectively.
29Appendix
Variable Definitions and Sources
Net margin/ta - interest income minus interest expense over total assets.
Before tax profits/ta -before tax profits over total assets.
Equity/ta - book value of equity (assets minus liabilities) over total assets
Non-interest earning assets/ta -cash, non-interest earning deposits at other banks, and other non-
interest earning assets over total assets
Customer & short term f/nding/ta  - all short term and long term deposits plus other non-deposit
short term funding over total assets
Overhead/ta - personnel expenses and other non-interest expenses over total assets
Foreign bank share - Foreign bank share is the number of foreign banks to total number of
banks. A bank is defined to be a foreign bank if  it has at least 50 percent foreign ownership.
All bank level variables are obtained from BankScope data base of IBCA.
Gdp/cap - real GDP per capita in US$.
Growth - annual growth rate in real GDP.
Inflation - the annual inflation of the GDP deflator.
Real interest - the nominal interest rate minus rate of inflation. Where available, nominal rate is
the rate on short term government securities. Otherwise, a rate changed by the Central Bank to
domestic banks such as the discount rate is used. If that is not available, then the commercial
bank deposit interest rate is used.
Interest rate data are from the IMF, International Financial Statistics.  Other macro data are from
World Bank National Accounts.
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